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Every culture' s attitude and treatment of the bodies of those who have
died manifests its understanding of the meaning of life and death . The late
medieval period faced the question of the use of cadavers for education
and research . Today society is struggling with the issue of determining the
criterion of death especially in relation to organ donation . Within this
context a new question is emerging. What is the ethical response to the
newly dead who could be sustained on support systems for the promotion
of social goods?
It is possible, or projected to be possible, to keep the bodies of persons
functioning indefinitely through artificial means after they have been
pronounced dead. This practice could benefit others through organ and
tissue donation, research, and education. Should this activity be promoted
or should it be halted before it becomes common practice? Would such a
practice enhance or detract from humane consideration of others? In order
to contribute to the ethical response to these questions, this paper will
discuss who fits in the category of neomorts, how they could contribute to
the well being of others, what values are at risk and what conditions ought
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to be met if the practice of using neomorts is to be humane and protect
fundamental values.
Statement of the Issue
Willard Gaylin, writing in Harpers, September, 1974, coined the term
"neomorts" for those persons who were pronounced dead, but whose vital
systems were maintained by artificial means. After describing the possible
benefits from the use of neomorts, Gaylin did not encourage the practice
for it seems a violation of human sensibilities. 2 However, Harold B. Shane
and Walter J. Daly, writing in The Futurist in 1986 seem to favor the
practice, as it has so many possibilities for helping the living. 3 It is
important that the moral dimension of the issue be considered in order to
guide practice and research as well as human sensibilities. 4
The Attractiveness of Neomorts
Each year in the United States over 200,000 persons die from such
causes as accident, suicide, and homicide. Since the bodies of these persons
are frequently intact and relatively disease free, they could be used for
experimentation, research, education, organ and tissue donation. The
risks to the living from the use of experimental drugs or procedures could
be minimized or eliminated if neomorts were used. Better controls for
research could be maintained. New surgical procedures could be
developed without fear of harming patients. Medical and nursing students
could be taught practices on the dead rather than on the living. The supply
of blood, bone marrow, and hormones could be augmented through the
maintenance of vital systems. Solid organs such as hearts, lungs, livers and
kidneys could be kept suitable for transplantation. Neomortoria (storage
places for neomorts) could be established to centralize and foster the
activities that the practice of neomorts would make possible. Tragic deaths
might seem to be redeemed through the medical good achieved.
The benefits from neomorts could be attained at minimal human
maintenance involvement because of the continuing advances of
technology. On the basis of the care needed, it would be attractive to
broaden the definition of death. If brain death is used as the criterion of
,/ death for neomorts, ventilators would be required to maintain cardiac and
respiratory functions. If the cessation of the cortical function is used as the
criterion of death, then neomorts could be maintained without the
complication and expense of respirators.5 Artificial nutrition and
hydration would still be required as well as excretion and cleanliness
procedures. All of these maintenance processes could be mechanized to
improve efficiency, a value dominant in our culture. 6
In addition to the value of efficiency, our culture promotes medical
progress. The achievements of medicine in the 20th century are prized and
further advances are expected. Once a technology has been developed
which accomplishes good, it is difficult to prohibit its use. The technological
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imperative is further enhanced by the reluctance to waste what could be
used for the lives of others. Hence, it would seem a waste if bodies could be
used for the advancement of medicine and are not. However, beneficence,
progress and efficiency are not sufficient to resolve the moral issue. If these
values are obtained through the violation of human beings or create
conditions which jeopardize necessary human sensibilities, the practice of
neomorts ought to be discontinued . There is a need for neomorts, but is the
practice "morally irreproachable"?7 Are there conditions morally
required? Do these conditions vary for different categories of persons, e.g.,
aborted fetuses, anencephalic newborns, and persons in a persistent
vegetative state?
Present State of the Practice
Prior to such techniques as intravenous hydration, nasogastric feeding,
bladder catheterization, and artificial ventilation, few persons survived
any length of time in a state of deep coma.s Today there are many persons
in a persistent vegetative state who are being maintained through artificial
means, most because it is considered morally offensive to withdraw
artificial hydration and nutrition.9 Some who are brain-dead are kept on
support systems for a short time in order to use their solid organs for
transplantation. The continued viability of an organ requires that it be
supplied with blood, either naturally or artificially. If organs are to be used
for transplantation, they must be kept viable, for within 45 minutes after
circulation to the brain ceases, there is enough ischemic damage that
organs cannot be transplanted. 10 At the present time, brain death is not
deemed a static condition of the tissues, therefore solid organs cannot be
maintained indefinitely. Solid organs are usually harvested within 48
hours of brain-death declarations." Today most organs for transplantation
come from victims of automobile, plane, and motorcycle accidents. Since
the need for such solid organs as lung, heart, kidney and liver far exceeds
the supply / demand, there is no need for banking organs.
However neomorts could be used for education, research, hormones
and replenishing body parts such as bone marrow, blood, bone, and body
tissue. In teaching hospitals, the immediately dead are often examined by
residents and interns for educational purposes. Although there is no
literature on the topic of the use of neomorts for research, it is known that
at Temple University Jarvik hearts were tested in brain-dead people after
animal experimentation. The consent of the families of the dead was
supposedly obtained for this research.
Cadavers have been used in nonmedical research. The California
Department of Transportation in 1978 used cadavers for vehicle safety
research, but the practice was discontinued because of serious public
protest. 12 Joel Feinberg suggests the aversion to using neomorts for
transportation research versus the lack of protest for medical research may
be more an indication of the esteem with which we treat medicine, rather
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than a moral evaluation of the practice. 13 Since the practice of neomorts is
an extension ofthe use of cadavers, research and organ donation , it will be
helpful to summarize why and under what conditions these practices are
conslUered moral and how the practice of neomorts differs from previous
practices.

Relation to Previous Practice
Today it is considered moral to use cadavers for education and research,
to involve persons in education and research and to foster organ donation.
These practices are praised because they contribute to the well-being of
others. In some instances, autopsies, procedures which mutilate dead
bodies, are seen as morally required to determine the cause of death.
Cadavers are stored for future use. There is a consensus that it is moral for
persons to participate in experimentation if it involves minimal risk and
informed consent has been given. Patients in teaching hospitals know they
are going to participate in the education of doctors and nurses, but also
that they will be at minimal risk.
Organ donations are encouraged as the need greatly exceeds the supply.
In some states, it is now routine to be asked if one wishes to be an organ
donor at the time of obtaining or renewing a driver's license. Arguments
have been made that consent to organ donation be presumed unless an
explicit contrary position has been taken. These arguments have not been
persuasive in the United States, but Belgium now presumes consent. 14 The
present practice in the United States stresses education to foster organ
donation. Recently, however, a national law was passed which requires
hospitals to have written protocol for the identification of potential organ
donors. Hospitals without such a policy will not receive Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement. Although t1lese are unresolved justice questions
regarding organ transplantation, it is considered moral and praiseworthy
to donate blood, tissue, bone marrow and organs if consent has been
obtained and there is minimal risk to the donor. When an organ is to be
donated following the person's death, conflict of interest requires that the
person declaring death not be the same person involved in the transplant
surgery. This assures that the organs are not retrieved before the death, or
that removing the organ is not the cause of death.
All of the above; conditions would apply to neomorts. In addition, the
neomorts would be "respiring cadavers."15 They resemble the living more
than the dead for they would be "warm, respiring, pulsating, evacuating
and excreting bodies requiring nursing, dietary and general grooming". 16
However, the cause of these activities would be extrinsic rather than
intrinsic. They would be maintained by artificial support systems such as
intravenous and nasogastric tubes , ventilators and mechanisms for
temperature control, not by the patient, but by those responsible for the
mechanical and pharmocological support systems. This new element
raises the question, what values are at risk if the bodies of dead persons are
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to be maintained so that they appear as if in a coma rather than dead?
Values at Risk

A practice is immoral if it violates fundamental human values or places
these values at risk without adequate justification. The practice of
neomorts entails the values of life and death, respect for the dead , selfdetermination and community. Why are these values at risk and what
conditions would be required to protect these fundamental values?
Life and Death

If a person is killed by the removal of an organ, the person is deprived of
life; if the person is kept on support systems for experimentations and
education, the person could be deprived of death. Since neomorts are by
definition dead, the practice involves the determination that death has
occurred so that the person is not deprived of either life or death. It is
therefore necessary to understand what the determination of death means .
Because this is a controversial topic and not the majorfocus of the study of
neomorts, a summary of the extensive recent thinking on the
determination of death is given and applied to neomorts.
Although death is a philosophical concept, biological criteria are
necessary to determine when death has occurred. Death is the absence of
life. Since life is a unity of integrating parts and functions, death is the
irreversible loss of the integrating functions of the organism as a whole. 17
Lamb argues that irreversibility is the essential aspect of any concept of
death. He points out that both medicine and religion, although offering
differing concepts of death, agree that "death is an irreversible
interruption of physical continuity" .18 What is irreversible is the capacity
to integrate.
A living being is characterized by the capacity to organize and regulate
different systems and activities. Such a capacity is irreversibly lost in death.
Some physiological activity, such as twitching or growing hair may
continue for a time in a dead being, but there is no longer interrelation of
activities for the good of the whole. Death occurs when the body's
physiological systems cease to work together and become disorganized
into a mere collection of chemicals. Biology reveals when this has taken
place.
The search for biological criteria of death is the search for the critical
system for fulfilling the integrating function of at least nine organ
systems. 19 The biological criteria change as new understanding evolves.
Previously, circulation and respiration were the critical systems in a
human being, but due to advances in physiology, there is a growing
consensus which places this function in the brain, specifically in the
brainstem. In its upper part, the brainstem contains the crucial center
responsible for generating the capacity for consciousness; in its lower parts
is the center for respiration. 20 The President's Commission for defining
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death recognized the primacy of the brain among organs as the body's
regulator. 21
The Commission, however, proposed that the following be adopted as
the Uniform Determination of Death Act:
An individual who has sustained either (I) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory function , or '(2) irreversible cessation of all function of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead . A determination of death must be made
in accordance with accepted standards.22

The Commission was sensitive to the traditional signs for the
determination of death and also recognized the importance of the
advances in physiology.
David Lamb in his extensive study, Death, Brain Death and Ethics,
argues that the two criteria are not necessary and, moreover, cause
confusion. He uses physiological evidence to show that the brain is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the death of the human being. The
brain generates, integrates and controls the complex bodily activities. The
cessation of heart and lungs signals death if the function of the heart and
lungs cannot be resuscitated. The heart and lungs supply the necessary
oxygen to the blood. Since lack of oxygen destroys the brain cells, the
brain cannot be resuscitated. As the President's Commission pointed out:
The brain cannot regenerate neural cells to replace ones that have permanently
stopped metabolizing. Hence, longer periods without blood flow (ischemia) or
oxygen (anoxia) may cause complete and irreversible loss of all brain functions .
When the entire brain has been so severely damaged, spontaneous respiration can
never return even though breathing may be maintained by artificial means for
some time.n

Death, then, is not death of the heart or lungs. Cessation of cardiorespiratory function is a cause, not a determination of death. 24 Therefore
the cessation of the function of the brain is the relevant criterion for
determining death of the person.
This in no way reduces a person to a brain, but recognizes the critical
organ for physiological functioning.
Tests are continually being refined which are reliable for determining
when the brain, including the brainstem, has ceased to function . Certain
drugs and hypothermia create symptoms similar to brain death by placing
the neurons in suspended animation rather than destroying the neurons.
Brain activity is restored when the effects of drugs or hypothermia
disappear. Therefore, once reversible causes such as intoxication, shock,
hypoxia, and hypothermia have been ruled out, clinical criteria can be
used. 25 At the present time, both clinical and diagnostic tests are available.
Clinical tests include inability to move, inability to breathe spontaneously,
unresponsiveness to light or pain. Diagnostic tests include an isoelectric
EEG, or cerebral angiogram or radioisotope brain scan which documents
the absence of blood flow to the brain.
Rather than using whole brain death as the criterion for determining the
death of human being, two other criteria have been offered:
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I. The cessation of the activity of the cortex, the center of conscious
acti vi ty. 26
2. The destruction of the brain rather than the cessation of
functioning of the whole brain. 27
The President's Commission rejected using the criteria of the cortex for
two reasons;
First, . .. it is not known which portions of the brain are responsible for cognition
and consciousness; what little is known points to substantial interconnection.
Thus, the 'higher' brain may well exist only as a metaphorical concept, not in
reality. Second, even when the sites of certain aspects of consciousness can be
found, cessation often cannot be assessed with the certainty that would be
required in applying a statutory definition.28

Since the cessation of the higher function of the mind is difficult to
determine and since it is not confirmed that these functions reside only in
the cortex, the center for conscious activity is not the relevant criterion for
determining death. Moreover, as Lamb and Frost point out, death is too
serious a matter for scepticism to obtain a foothold 29 or for arguing for
different definitions of death for different social functions. The President's
Commission rightly held that "the social and legal as well as medical
consequences attached to a determination of death make it imperative that
the diagnosis be incontrovertible."3o To protect individuals and society,
the definition of death should be consistent in all areas, i.e., "criminal law
(murder), tort law (wrongful death), family law (status of spouse and
children), property and estate law, insurance law (payment of life
insurance benefits), and tax law."31
David Lamb rejects the criterion of destruction of the brain. He
distinguishes between death of the organism as a whole and death of the
whole organism. The cessation of the function of the whole brain is the
irreversible loss of the integrating function of the organism as a whole.
Groups of cells may continue to function but the integrating function of
the organism has ceased. Lamb rightly argues that our concern is with the
death of a human being, not with the life of cells.32 Moreover, he disputes
the cases offered to support the criteria of destruction ofthe brain because
the cases of persons declared to be brain-dead and then revived, were not
brain-dead according to the definition of whole brain-death, that is, loss of
function of the brainstem. Rather the examples given by those arguing for
the destruction of the brain were cases of cerebral hemisphere dysfunction,
not dysfunction of the whole brain. 33 Lamb argues that many studies
support the position that,
Once tests have diagnosed a loss of brainstem function , and have eliminated
hypothermia and drug intoxication, no patient has ever shown signs of reversal,
with or without a respirator.)4

The neomort, then, must meet the criteria of whole brain death and be
pronounced dead by someone authorized to do so. Biologically, this means
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the brainstem has ceased to function . Philosophically this means the
systemic integrative function which specifies life is irreversibly lost.
According to this definition, persons in a persistent vegetative state are
excluded from the category of neomorts. Likewise an anencephalic infant
and an aborted fetus are in the category of neomort only if the brain,
including the brains tern, has ceased to function. Due to the complexity of
the issues, a separate argument for each of the categories of the above
non-neomorts is necessary in order to consider the morality of their use for
research, education or organ donation.
Once death has been determined, recognition of this must take place by
celebrating the individual's life as well as recognizing the individual's
departure from the community. Otherwise the neomort, his or her family,
and society are deprived of the individual's death. The symbols and ritual
by which a family and a culture recognize the passing from life to death of
an individual are necessary to affirm the death ofthe neomort. Something
new would be added to the symbolism and ritual to speak the fact that the
bodily presence will be retained for a time for the well-being of others.
The language used to designate the neomort would need to be sensitive
to the ontological reality of the neomort. For example, the mechanical
system used to maintain cardiopulmonary functioning is not a life-support
system but a physical maintenance mechanism of the body of a dead
person. This recognition in both symbol and language is important
because the neomort appears as if sleeping, that is, more alive than dead .
Symbolisms, ritual and language need to be developed to convey this
reality. This is extremely important to avoid a rationalistic concept of the
person. It is not enough to know conceptually that a person is dead.
Persons are more than minds. In order to meet the other human
dimensions such as memories, emotions and affections, the recognition of
death must be conveyed and acknowledged through more than concepts.
This could entail ritual burial of something of the neomort.J5
Respect for the Dead

Not only must death be recognized but the dead must be respected, for
violation of the dead violates the living. But the task of respecting the
ventilating cadaver is difficult and prolonged.
Although the neomort is dead, the deterioration of the body is being
delayed . The bodily identity of the person is therefore maintained. William
E. May reminds us that,
... while the body retains a recognizable form, even in death, it commands the
respect of identity. No longer a human presence, it still reminds us ofthe presence
that once was utterly inseparable from it. l •

For the neomort this identity of presence remains and is much more
vivid than in the presence of a cadaver. Those working with a cadaver find
it extremely difficult to maintain respect for the cadaver.37 Consequently it
will be much more difficult when the cadaver is being ventilated. Gaylin's
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concern that the practice of neomorts could be a violation of human
sensibilities and , hence, dehumanizing, is well taken. If our sensibilities are
to be educated as Feinberg argues,38 then reflection is necessary on what
presently is needed to respect cadavers and whether or not these practices
of respect would be adequate for dealing with neomorts. One requirement
is to minimize as much as possible the identity of the neomort. Since our
identity is most expressed facially, a procedure ought to be devised to
"deface" the neomort. 39 An extreme procedure would be decapitation; the
traditional covering of the face may not be adequate. Those involved in
working with neomorts would be in the best position to devise the
procedure.
Individuals and cultures are harmed if actions are taken contrary to
life-giving sentimentalities. This is of particular concern today in a society
in which it is most difficult to find ways to limit technology so that it is
serving human values and not becoming an end in itself. Consequently the
respect for the dead as well as protection of the sensibilities of the living is a
major issue for the practice of neomorts . The suspected aversion of society
to the practice will require public discussion, if consent to the practice is to
be obtained.
Self-determination

Individuals and society have an investment in what happens to their
bodies in death. Therefore the consent of the individual or the individual's
representative is necessary if the person, when dead, is to be used as a
neomort. Technically this consent is given today when a person signs an
organ donation card. According to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the
donation allows for the gift of "all or part of the body for research or
therapeutic purposes".40 The language on the form states that the person
consents to donate his or her whole body for organ donation, research or
education unless the donation has been restricted. 41 An informed decision,
however, requires that knowledge of the risks and benefits be implied in
the decision. Since the practice of the use of neomorts has not been
publicly discussed, it cannot be inferred that today, one in donating his or
her body for research, education, or organ donation has consented to be
used as a neomort.
Supplied with the information about neomorts, a person could willingly
consent to be used for the practice. The new element would be the specifics
to which one is consenting and specifying the length of time during which
the body would be used for research or education or leaving the time to the
discretion of the researchers. Regulation would be required to ensure that
directions were being honored.
The function of review could be carried out by Institutional Review
Boards which presently evaluate research and consent processes. The laws
governing research on human subjects would need to be adjusted to
recognize the reality of the neomort. This would entail identifying what is
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to be prohibited.
Consent is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the proper use of
neomort. What one consents to is limited by the legitimate interests of
society. A person is prohibited from willing that his or her body be
desecrated for, as Frost points out, "desecration of a human body, even
though clearly dead, threatens respect for the living".42 Since selling of
persons entails a desecration, it seems to follow that neomorts not be
reduced to consumer products. The arguments against the sale of organs
or the sale of cadavers ought to apply to neomorts. Furthermore, it would
be a denial of death to donate womb, ova, or sperm from neomorts, for it
would appear that the dead were still living and generating new life with
the responsibilities this brings. Both the community and the dead would be
offended by the contradiction implied in the donation of ova or sperm.
Community

Although community bonds would be weakened if the practice of
neomorts were not limited to those who are brain-dead and who have
consented to the practice, community could be strengthened if humane
practices were implemented. It is through our body that we communicate
with others and help others. In fact, as William E. May argues, there are
strong religious and communitarian justifications for donating body
parts. 43 Pope Pius XII, in the early days of organ donation, 1956,
expressed a similar position when he stated:
A person may will to dispose of his body and to destine it to ends that are useful,
morally irreproachable and even noble, among them the desire to aid the sick and
suffering. One may make a decision of this nature with respect to his own body
with full realization of the reverence which is due it . .. this decision should not be
condemned but positively justified. 44

Community is built through the recognition of interdependence and
action consistent with this recognition. People who participate in research
and education acknowledge this interdependence as well as recognize that
they are the beneficiaries of the research and education to which others
have contributed. The symbolism and ritual required to recognize the
death of the neomort entails acknowledging the consent of the person to
contribute to the well-being of others and to the building of community.
In donating one's body for use as a neomort, a person is contributing to
the well-being of others and thus testifying that "self-interest" is not the
only significant human motivation".45 Moreover, as Murray points out,
"Gifts to strangers affirm the solidarity of the community over and above
the depersonalizing and alienating forces of mass society and market
relations."46
In organ, bone, and tissue donation, a person is fulfilling the Christian
command to love and share what one possesses. The donation is not giving
one's life for another, but recognizing that strangers can be served through
the donation of one's body.47 The fact that this sharing continues after
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death does ,not change the act of sharing.
The values of community and justice require that it is not merely the
vulnerable in society who are used for the practice of neomorts. It also
requires that the benefits attained by the practice be shared by all of
society. The justice ofthe present practices of organ donation would apply
to the practice of neomor.ts.
Conclusion

The value analysis of this paper reveals that the practice of neomorts is
an extension of present practices which are considered moral.
Furthermore, conditions can be provided, at least in theory, which protect
fundamental human values, while enabling persons to choose to donate
their physical remains for the help of others. This donation is a recognition
of death, as well as recognition of the responsibility to relate to future
nameless individuals who can be assisted.
The analysis also reveals that the values most at risk in the practice of
neomorts are of death and the value of humane sensibilities. The practice
could promote the tendency to deny the reality of death because the donor,
family and society know the practice will delay bodily deterioration. This,
rather than concern for others, could be the reason for consent. If this is so,
the practice would contribute to the fallacy that death is the enemy and
provide another means for the "frightened flight from death".48
Humane sensibilities are in danger. Those who must interface with the
neomorts, i.e., researchers, doctors, nurses, and maintenance personnel,
are involved in the delicate task of respecting the individuality of the
neomort and, at the same time, recognizing that the neomort is dead.
These persons will be called to educate their perceptions, sentiments and
behavior so that they are not dehumanized through the process. This
requires sensitive reflection and discussion by those involved.
It does not follow that, because fundamental human values can be
protected in theory, it is wise to promote the practice of neomorts. Wisdom
requires that the need for neomorts be justified in relation to competing
alternatives. The answer to this issue involves another study to reflect on
the values and beliefs of society which shape the direction of health care.
The decision regarding neomorts is not isolated, but fits into a web of
practices promoted by fundamental assumptions. The practice of
neomorts is consistent with high technology medicine seeking a cure for
disease. Is this the direction society ought to reinforce? There are other
competing directions such as providing minimal care for all, promoting
preventive medicine, minimizing the depersonalization of health care.
Further reflection on these issues is necessary in order to respond wisely to
the question of whether the newly dead should be maintained on support
systems to help the living.
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